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Testimony of
Congressman Mark Souder
Regarding H.R. 1445, the Workplace Religious Freedom Act
Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations
November 10, 2005
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before the
Employer-Employee Relations Subcommittee today. I appreciate being able to
discuss a bill that I have introduced, along with my colleague
Congresswoman Carolyn McCarthy, that will help restore religious liberties
in the workplace.
The Workplace Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1445, has broad, bi-partisan
support in both the House and Senate, indicating that it is an issue that
deserves serious consideration. Senators John Kerry and Rick Santorum have
been the leaders on this legislation for a number of years, and I am
pleased to be able to work with them in moving this legislation forward in
the House.
Let me start, by laying out the rationale for why this legislation is
needed at this particular point in American history. Then, I’ll address,
briefly, some of the concerns that I have heard about this legislation,
and I’ll be happy to answer any questions my colleagues may have.
Why WRFA? Why Now?
As America becomes increasingly diverse in its ethnic and religious
makeup, and as more Americans are finding their religious beliefs at odds
with a secular, often anti-religious society, the need for strengthening
religious liberties has become all the more important and, indeed,
necessary. America was founded as a place of religious freedom, yet today
those very freedoms are being denied as some employers refuse to work out
reasonable accommodations for their employees’ religious observances.
Catholics, Jews, Muslims, conservative evangelical Christians and
individuals from many other faiths have found themselves in the position
of having to compromise their religious convictions in order to keep their
job.
While the large majority of the Title VII religious accommodation cases
involve religious garb, grooming or observance of holy days, about 25
percent of the cases involve other religious accommodation requests, such
as conscience objections to certain work activities. One gentleman who is
with us in the audience today was working as a network designer and
systems engineer in the Maryland suburbs. As a member of the Seventh Day
Adventist Church, he objected to his assignment to work on a website
project that sold and distributed pornography. Fortunately, this gentleman
was able to find work elsewhere since he was a highly skilled worker, but
he shouldn’t have been forced to make this choice. There are many other
employees across the country that are not so fortunate.
A former small businessman and a conservative evangelical Christian
myself, I understand the tension in the workplace between accommodating
the beliefs of all religious employees—particularly those of a minority
religion—and maintaining a profitable and productive business. It isn’t
always easy to find a solution agreeable to both the employer and
employee. Yet, if America is to stand as the protector of religious
freedom, the work environment must be a place where people of all faiths
are free to follow their conscience without fear of losing their job.
How Would WRFA Change Current Law?
As you may know, existing civil rights law does provide some protections
to religious people in the workplace. However, these protections have been
severely undermined by a few Supreme Court cases that have effectively
thwarted the intent of Congress—as expressed in the 1972 amendments to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—to protect “all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s
or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue
hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business (42 U.S.C. §
2000e(j)).”
In Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, the Supreme Court re-interpreted
Title VII religious liberty protections by applying a “de minimis” cost
standard to the definition of “undue hardship” on the employer. The Court
held that “to require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to
give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship.” This new de minimis
standard established such a low threshold for employers that today there
is little incentive for them to work out religious accommodations with
their employees.
The Workplace Religious Freedom Act is necessary to re-establish the
intent of Congress that only real hardship is reason for an employer not
to provide a reasonable accommodation for an employee. My bill would
define “undue hardship” as a “significant difficulty or expense,” similar
to the definition used in the Americans with Disabilities Act. The bill
establishes several criteria for determining what constitutes a
significant difficulty or expense, including the costs of providing such
an accommodation, the size of the employer (in terms of financial
resources and number of employees), and the geographic separateness or
administrative or fiscal relationship of an employer’s multiple
facilities.
The bill I introduced will also establish that a “reasonable
accommodation” “shall remove the conflict between employment requirements
and the religious observance or practice of the employee.” The reasonable
accommodation requirement of current law was interpreted by the Supreme
Court in Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook to favor the preferred
accommodation of the employer—not the employee. The Workplace Religious
Freedom Act would require the employer to find an accommodation that
satisfies the employee as long as that accommodation does not impose a
significant difficulty or expense on the employer.
Together, I believe the proposed new definitions of “reasonable
accommodation” and “undue hardship” strike the appropriate balance between
employer and employee rights as they relate to religious liberty in the
workplace.
To clarify the rights of employers, however, the legislation states that
an employee must be able to perform the “essential functions” of his or
her job “with or without reasonable accommodation.” This provision ensures
that an employee cannot request an accommodation that would make it
impossible to fulfill the core requirements of a job. The “essential
functions” term cannot, however, be interpreted to include practices such
as wearing religious clothing, taking time off for religious observances,
or “other practices that may have a temporary or tangential impact on the
ability to perform job functions.” Those practices may not be considered
an “essential function” of a job under this legislation, unless an
accommodation for those practices is believed to be an “undue hardship” on
the employer. For instance, if an individual applied for a weekend
watchman job at a warehouse and knew that his particular faith disallowed
working on either a Saturday or Sunday, the employer would not be
obligated to provide an accommodation for that individual.
Addressing Concerns
Whenever legislation deals with such a highly individual and personal
subject as religion in the workplace, there will always be criticism from
various groups that are unsure of how it will be carried out in practice.
Fortunately, however, WRFA does have some precedent in state law that can
be examined to determine how it might play out on a national level. The
state of New York passed a law similar to WRFA in 2002 that, by all
reports, has not resulted in the dire predictions anticipated by critics
on both the right and left. According to Attorney General Eliot Spitzer,
New York’s law has not been overly burdensome on businesses or resulted in
an increase in litigation; nor has it resulted in the infringement of a
woman’s ability to have an abortion or purchase birth control as the ACLU
has predicted.
Still, even with the positive experience with workplace religious freedom
law in New York, criticisms of WRFA still exist. I do believe, however,
that some of these concerns can be resolved with a clear explanation of
the facts about the bill.
I know that my colleague Mrs. McCarthy will be addressing some of the
concerns from the more liberal perspective, so I will focus my analysis on
those criticisms from traditional Republican constituencies—namely the
business community. First, however, let me just say that religious
accommodation will not work without a little give and take from all
interested parties. Religious accommodation cannot mean anything an
employee wants it to be—especially when it has a direct impact on other
individuals, whether they be co-workers or a business’ clients or
customers. Thus, whether one is a conservative Christian, devout Muslim,
or adherent of a smaller, less organized religion, he or she should not be
able to demand an accommodation that would impose significant difficulty
or expense on the employer or result in the inability to perform the core
functions of his or her job.
With that said, let me address just a few of the concerns of the business
community: the potential for a rise in litigation and a growth in
fraudulent religious claims.
First, quite to the contrary of some of WRFA’s critics, regarding
litigation, the Workplace Religious Freedom Act is expected to reduce or
at the very least stabilize litigation. Between 1993 and 2003, claims to
the EEOC involving religious discrimination in the workplace rose 82
percent. During this same time period, racial discrimination cases
declined slightly. By clarifying the “undue hardship” standard for
employers to work out a religious accommodation with employees, litigation
will be reduced as fewer employees will be forced to sue in order to get
the attention of their employers.
Additionally, according to James Morgan, a professor of Legal Studies in
Business at California State University, Chico, there has been some
disagreement in lower courts as to the interpretation of the Hardison and
Philbrook Supreme Court Opinions. This judicial confusion has led to
varying standards and interpretations of the Title VII religious
accommodation provisions, possibly resulting in an increase in litigation.
Morgan writes: “A strong argument can be made that many lower courts are
writing opinions favoring the employee’s position, in possible violation
of the restrictive mandate that necessarily flows from the Hardison/Philbrook
approach, because they perceive the Court’s position as overly burdensome
on the rights of religious applicants and employees.” WRFA will ensure
that the religious accommodation provisions (as amended in 1972 to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) are clarified in U.S. Code as
originally intended by Congress. This clarification will help reduce
litigation, while at the same time provide greater incentive for employers
to work out an amicable accommodation with religious employees.
Secondly, let me address the concern that WRFA will result in an
increasing number of bogus religious claims by employees who are seeking
time off or dislike strict requirements on outward appearance and dress. I
can sympathize with these concerns from the business community, especially
as religious beliefs are becoming increasingly more personal and difficult
to classify according to more traditional views of religious belief and
practice. However, the Workplace Religious Freedom Act does nothing to
change the current definition of “religion” under EEOC guidelines.
Existing Title VII interpretive guidelines published by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) provide that: (1) religious
practices protected under Title VII include “moral or ethical beliefs as
to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of
traditional religious views;” (2) a person may ascribe to a particular
religious belief even if “no religious group espouses such beliefs or the
fact the religious group to which the individual professes to belong may
not accept such belief,” and (3) the term “religious practice” includes
“both religious observances and practices.”
Admittedly, this broad interpretation of religion and religious practices
makes it difficult for an employer to call into question the validity of
an employee’s stated religious beliefs or practices. However, the courts
can examine whether an individual has a “sincerely held” religious belief.
Few individuals would go through the trouble and expense of being fired
from their job and suing their employer in order to obtain an
accommodation if they did not sincerely hold their religious beliefs. And,
of course, there is a limit to what an employee can receive as an
accommodation. If the employee’s request would result in a significant
difficulty or expense to the employer, the accommodation would not have to
be granted. Additionally, I am hesitant to allow the federal government to
further tinker with the definition of religion for fear that it could be
defined so narrowly that many religious beliefs and practices would be
considered ineligible for purposes of making accommodations.
I am sure there are other concerns that I have not addressed, but I
believe these are the most common concerns I have heard. Part of the
reason I have been looking forward to this hearing is to listen to the
panel members and my colleagues to understand the concerns that they may
have. This legislation has been carefully crafted over a number of years,
but I am always open to considering other legitimate possibilities as long
as they result in restoring the intent of the 1972 amendments to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which was to hold employers accountable to working out
a reasonable accommodation for their religious employees.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to testify before the
subcommittee today. I am happy to answer any questions. |